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ARBITRATION
When Should a Court Rather
Than an Arbitrator Decide
Whether a Claim Is Arbitrable?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 4-7. © 2002 American Bar Association.
Jay E. Grenig is a professor of law
at Marquette University Law
School in Milwaukee, Wisconsin;
(414) 288-5377 or jgrenig@
earthlink.net. He is the author of
West's Alternative Dispute
Resolution with Forms
(2nd edition).
ISSUE
When must a court rather than an
arbitrator make threshold determi-
nations of eligibility for arbitration?
FACTS
Karen Howsam was a customer of
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. in March
and April 1986, at which time she
was advised by two Dean Witter
brokers to invest in four limited
partnerships. Howsam remained
invested in those limited partner-
ships until late 1994, when she
closed her Dean Witter accounts
and moved her funds to another
investment firm. While a customer
of Dean Witter, Howsam signed a
standard client services agreement
providing that all controversies
between her and Dean Witter must
be determined by arbitration.
On March 7, 1997, Howsam com-
menced arbitration before the
National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD) regarding Dean
Witter's recommendation that she
invest in the four limited partner-
ships. She later filed an amended
claim alleging that Dean Witter,
through its agents, made material
misrepresentations about the invest-
ments prior to her decision to pur-
chase them and that the invest-
ments were unsuitable for someone
with her investment needs. Howsam
further alleged that Dean Witter
continued to inform her that the
investments were sound, despite
indications to the contrary, which
impeded her understanding of the
true nature of the investments
until 1994.
In commencing the arbitration,
Howsam executed a Uniform
Submission Agreement as required
by the NASD. The Submission
Agreement provided that she agreed
to be bound by the NASD Uniform
Code of Arbitration. The NASD
Code contains a provision that no
claim is eligible for submission to
arbitration after six years have
elapsed from the occurrence or
event giving rise to the claim.
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REYNOLDS, INc.
DOCKET No. 01-800
ARGUMENT DATE:
OCTOBER 9, 2002
FROM: THE TENTH CIRCUIT
Dean Witter brought suit for
declaratory relief in federal court,
seeking to enjoin Howsam from
arbitrating her dispute with Dean
Witter on the ground that the dis-
pute was time-barred under the
NASD rules. Dean Witter argued
that the question of arbitrability of
Howsam's claims was for the court,
and not for NASD arbitrators, to
decide. Howsam responded by filing
a motion to dismiss, arguing that
the district court lacked jurisdiction
to decide the issue of arbitrability.
The district court concluded that
the parties had "clearly and unmis-
takably" agreed that all disputes
between the parties, including ques-
tions regarding the arbitrability of,
those disputes, would be determined
by an arbitrator rather than by the
courts. The district court dismissed
Dean Witter's suit.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held
that the district court erred in find-
ing that the parties had "clearly and
unmistakably" agreed to allow an
arbitrator, rather than the courts, to
decide whether specific disputes are
arbitrable. 261 F.3d 956 (10th Cir.
2001). The court held that the origi-
nal arbitration agreement signed by
Dean Witter and Howsam, as sup-
plemented by the subsequent sub-
mission agreement required by
NASD and signed only by the cus-
tomer, was the controlling arbitra-
tion contract between the parties.
The court found that Howsam had
agreed in the original agreement to
choose an arbitration forum from a
list of approved organizations and,
in filing the submission agreement,
elected to have her claims resolved
by NASD pursuant to NASD rules
and regulations.
The Tenth Circuit reasoned that the
NASD Code provision, § 10304,
requiring claims to be brought with-
in six years of the occurrence or
event giving rise to the claim can be
reasonably interpreted only one
way-as a substantive limit on the
claims that the parties have con-
tracted to submit to arbitration. The
Tenth Circuit found that § 10304
could not provide the type of "clear
and convincing" evidence that is
required to allow arbitrators to
decide the arbitrability of the par-
ties' dispute. The Tenth Circuit
observed that it seems entirely pos-
sible that an express statement in
the contract is not only preferable,
but also necessary to a finding that
the parties "clearly and unmistak-
ably" agreed to submit arbitrability
questions to an arbitrator rather
than to the courts. The Tenth
Circuit concluded that the courts,
not the arbitrators themselves, must
decide whether a claim is time-
barred under that provision,
because the agreements between
Howsam and Dean Witter did not
"clearly and unmistakably" provide
that the question of arbitrability
should be resolved by an arbitrator.
The Supreme Court thereafter
granted Howsam's petition request-
ing review of the Tenth Circuit's
decision. 122 S.Ct. 1171 (2002).
CASE ANALYSIS
Arbitration is a matter of contract,
and parties should not be forced to
arbitrate issues that have not been
agreed upon. AT&T Technologies,
Inc. v. Communications Workers of
America, 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986).
In First Options of Chicago, Inc. v.
Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995), the
Supreme Court declared that, just
as the arbitrability of the merits of a
dispute depends upon whether the
parties agreed to arbitrate that dis-
pute, the question of who has the
primary power to decide arbitrabili-
ty turns upon what the parties
agreed on that matter. 514 U.S.
at 943.
In First Options, the Supreme
Court described the analysis courts
must apply in determining whether
arbitrators or courts are to decide
whether a matter is subject to arbi-
tration. The Court stated:
Courts should not assume that
the parties agreed to arbitrate
arbitrability unless there is
"clea[r] and unmistakabl[e] evi-
dence that they did so. ... In this
manner the law treats silence or
ambiguity about the question
"who (primarily) should decide
arbitrability" differently from the
way it treats silence or ambiguity
about the question "whether a
particular merits-related dispute
is arbitrable because it is within
the scope of a valid arbitration
agreement"-for in respect to
this latter question the law
reverses the presumption.
514 U.S. at 1924 (citations
omitted).
The Court explained that the arbi-
trability inquiry is more stringent
given the principle that a party can
be forced to arbitrate only those
issues it specifically has agreed to
submit to arbitration.
Section 10304 (formerly § 15) of
the NASD Code states that "[no
dispute, claim or controversy shall
be eligible for submission to arbitra-
tion under this Code where (6)
years have elapsed from the occur-
rence or event giving rise to the act
or dispute, claim or controversy."
Section 10324 (formerly § 35) of
the NASD Code states that "arbitra-
tors shall be empowered to interpret
and determine the applicability of
all provisions under this Code."
According to Howsam, the time lim-
itation in Section 10304 is a proce-
dural rather than substantive rule.
She argues that the limitation does
not present an issue of arbitrability
and thus must be decided by the
(Continued on Page 6)
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arbitrator. She argues that the plain
language of the agreement provides
"clear and unmistakable" evidence
of an intent to arbitrate timeliness.
Dean Witter contends that the con-
cept of "arbitrability" encompasses
all restrictions on the scope of arbi-
tration. It asserts that the arbitra-
tion agreement does not "clearly
and unmistakably" evidence an
intent to arbitrate arbitrability.
Accordingly, Dean Witter says
that a court must decide whether
Howsam's claim is eligible for sub-
mission to arbitration.
Although it was the securities indus-
try that sought the inclusion of arbi-
tration provisions in its agreements
with its customers, the Securities
Industry Association argues in sup-
port of Dean Witter that determina-
tions regarding eligibility should not
be made by arbitrators-who may
apply varying standards and whose
rulings on eligibility are insulated
from effective challenge-unless the
parties clearly and unmistakably
indicate their desire to arbitrate
that critical initial issue.
SIGNIFICANCE
Using conflicting lines of reasoning,
the U.S. courts of appeals are
sharply divided on the issue of who
determines whether an action is
time-barred by the NASD Code.
This case presents the Supreme
Court with an opportunity to
resolve the split among the
circuits.
In addition to the Tenth Circuit, the
Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh
Circuits have held that courts, and
not arbitrators, should determine
whether an action is time-barred by
the NASD Code because that deter-
mination involves the scope of the
arbitrator's subject matter jurisdic-
tion. PaineWebber, Inc. v. Hoffman,
984 F.2d 1372 (3d Cir. 1993); Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. McCoy, 995
F.2d 649 (6th Cir. 1997); Smith
Barney, Inc. v. Schell, 53 F.3d 807
(7th Cir. 1995); Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Cohen, 62 F.3d 831 (11th Cir.
1995).
The Seventh Circuit explained that
the time period in § 15 of the NASD
Code is not a statute of limitations
in the ordinary sense, but that it
defines the arbitrator's subject mat-
ter jurisdiction. Because § 15
defines which claims are cognizable
in an arbitration proceeding, the
Seventh Circuit held that a district
court faced with an application for
an order compelling arbitration
before the NASD must determine
whether the Code bars the arbitra-
tors from exercising jurisdiction.
On the other hand, the First,
Second, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits have held that arbitrators,
and not courts, can decide the issue
of timely submission to arbitration
of a securities dispute. PaineWebber,
Inc. v. Elahi, 87 F.3d 589 (1st Cir.
1996); PaineWebber, Inc. v. Bybyk,
81 F.3d 1193, 1196 (2d Cir. 1996);
Smith Barney Shearson, Inc. v.
Boone, 47 F.3d 750 (5th Cir. 1995);
FSC Securities Corp. v. Freel, 14
F.3d 1310, 1312-13 (8th Cir. 1994);
O'Neel v. National Ass'n of
Securities Dealers, Inc., 667 F.2d
804 (9th Cir. 1982). The First
Circuit reasoned that many a
mandatory procedural rule could be
called an "arbitrability" rule if the
failure to comply prevented arbitra-
tion of the merits. According to the
First Circuit, § 15 is analogous to a
statute of limitations rather than a
"substantive eligibility require-
ment." The First Circuit stated that
in such cases, the issue of timeli-
ness is for the arbitrator to decide.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia has applied the
presumption in favor of arbitration
to the question of whether the court
or the arbitrator should decide if a
claim was barred by the statute of
limitations. Hanes Corp. v. Millard,
531 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
The Supreme Court has the
opportunity to determine whether
the issue of "arbitrability" includes
only the questions of whether the
parties are bound by a valid agree-
ment to arbitrate and whether the
underlying dispute is within that
agreement.
The First Circuit's opinion recog-
nizes that there are two types
of arbitrability. Substantive
arbitrability is concerned with the
question of whether the parties have
contractually agreed to submit a
particular dispute to arbitration.
Procedural arbitrability, on the oth-
er hand, is concerned with whether
there has been compliance with the
procedures for submitting a dispute
to arbitration. The Revised Uniform
Arbitration provides that when the
parties have not agreed otherwise,
questions of procedural arbitrability
are for the arbitrator to decide. Cf
John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston,
376 U.S. 543 (1964) (in a case
involving a collective bargaining
agreement, the Supreme Court held
that once it is determined that the
parties are obligated to submit the
subject matter of a dispute to arbi-
tration, "procedural" questions that
grow out of the dispute and bear on
its final disposition should be left to
the arbitrator).
The Court in John Wiley explained
that whether procedural prerequi-
sites apply, whether they have been
followed or excused, and whether
the unexcused failure to follow them
bars arbitration cannot ordinarily be
answered without consideration of
the merits of the dispute presented
for arbitration. See also
Issue No. 1
International Union of Operating
Engineers v. Flair Builders, Inc.,
406 U.S. 487 (1972) (once it is
determined that parties had signed
an agreement to arbitrate "any dif-
ference," then a claim that particu-
lar grievances are barred by the
doctrine of laches is an arbitrable
question under the agreement).
Unlike most of the arbitration cases
submitted to the Supreme Court in
recent years, this case presents a
situation in which the consumer is
demanding arbitration and the party
that included an arbitration clause
in the contract presented to the
consumer is arguing against arbitra-
tion. Nonetheless, some believe that
requiring courts to make the deter-
mination as to whether a claim is
timely may provide a base level of
fairness for parties with limited
choice regarding arbitration. The
Securities Industry Association sug-
gests that allowing courts to deter-
mine eligibility reduces the risk of
either intentional or defacto nonen-
forcement of the timeliness require-
ment by arbitrators.
On the other hand, however,
requiring issues of timeliness to be
submitted to a court rather than an
arbitrator may increase the costs of
arbitration and delay resolution of
the merits of the claims submitted
to arbitration. Requiring a "mini-
trial" to resolve timeliness disputes
before proceeding to arbitration
could result in needless delay and
obstruction in the courts, discourag-
ing consumers from seeking recov-
ery for their claims.
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